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ABSTRACT
This paper studies the impact of the creation of a new organ inside the Brazilian Judiciary structure, named 
the “National Council of Justice”, which was the result of a specific constitutional amendment. The emersion 
of this new power created a huge discussion about the principle of separation of powers in the country, 
specially faced by the Supreme Court in Case nº 3367, decided in 2006. Firstly, the article shows the main 
arguments used by the most important Brazilian Court to confront the issue. Moreover, this research aims 
to present, in an original way discussed in the author’s PhD thesis, a new function personally advocated for 
this “National Council of Justice” regarding the systematization of judgments under Brazilian judicial review 
framework. It could bring a new understanding of division of functions in Brazil and possibly in Latin America, 
considering the reality of its development by one entity which doesn´t belong to the democratic circuit.
KEYWORDS
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RESUMEN
En este artículo se estudia el impacto de la creación de un nuevo órgano dentro de la estructura del Poder Judicial 
brasileño, llamado el “Consejo Nacional de Justicia”, que fue el resultado de una enmienda constitucional 
específica. La emersión de este nuevo poder ha creado un gran debate sobre el principio de separación de 
poderes en el país, especialmente frente a la Corte Suprema en la sentencia n º 3367, del año 2006.
Por lo tanto, en primer lugar, el artículo muestra los principales argumentos utilizados por las más importantes 
Cortes de Brasil para enfrentar el problema. Por otra parte, esta investigación tiene como objetivo presentar, de 
una manera original discutido en la tesis doctoral del autora, una nueva función defendido personalmente por este 
“ Consejo Nacional de Justicia “ con respecto a la sistematización de las sentencias marco de revisión judicial 
brasileño. Podría traer una nueva comprensión de la división de funciones en Brasil y posiblemente en América 
Latina, teniendo en cuenta la realidad de su desarrollo por una entidad que no pertenece al circuito democrático.
«Para que no se pueda abusar del poder, 
es preciso que el poder detenga al poder» 
Charles Louis de Secondat. Barón Montesquieu
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INTRODUCTION 
This research aims to study the impact of the 
creation of the National Council of Justice with 
regard to the debate about the possible violation 
of the separation of power principle, a subject 
discussed by the Supreme Court in assessing the 
unconstitutionality lawsuit No. 3367. In addition, after 
making a comparison with the institutional reality of 
some institutions in Europe and Latin America, the 
paper proposes the development of  a  new  function 
for  the  National  Council  of  Justice  under  judicial 
review, solution inspired on the Doctoral thesis 
defended by the author on the subject.
Therefore, the research was divided into three 
topics that summarize the essence of the paper: 
(I) the creation of the National Council of Justice, 
here we intended to present the reasons why this 
institution was created in Brazil; (II) the analysis of 
ADI 3367, lawsuit filed  before  the  Supreme  Court 
and  which  questioned  whether  the creation  of 
the  National  Council  of Justice  would  violate  the 
separation  of  power principle, the specific focus 
of the investigation; (III) justification for a new role 
for the National Council, an initiative that has the 
potential of improving judicial review in Brazil to 
ensure greater systematization of decisions given 
under the specific control of constitutionality and 
which can serve as inspiration for other institutional 
realities.
1. THE CREATION OF THE NATIONAL COUNCIL OF 
JUSTICE IN BRAZIL
The debate concerning the necessary changes to 
improve the judiciary is an old one, and it has the 
aim of making its performance more efficient and 
expeditious. One could say that this debate has even 
of more significant relevance in Latin America, since 
this  region  historically  does  not  have  the  same 
institutional  solidity which  can  be observed in 
more developed countries, and the judiciary has a 
role in rescuing the hope for better days in a society 
which is still trying to guarantee fundamental rights. 
Brazil fits into this context: although it has made 
significant advances in recent years in its social 
indicators it still needs to advance the process of 
institutional strengthening.
I have chosen as the specific focus of this article 
the analysis of an instrument to strengthen Judiciary 
control, represented by the creation of the National 
Council of Justice in 2004. Among other important 
functions, the entity was established based on the 
perceived need to strengthen two relevant points in 
Judiciary action: (I) achieve genuine administrative, 
financial and functional control of the judiciary, by 
more rigorously inspecting any flaws observed in its 
activities, (II) develop a plan for the Judiciary  Power, 
establishing  goals  for  the  Judiciary  in  order  to 
improve  its functionality.
The National Council of Justice now has its own 
prevision in the Brazilian Constitution, and the basic 
profile of its functions is found in Article 103-B. As 
one reads this article it is possible to realize, first of 
all, that there is a concern with the Members of the 
Council, which are mostly members of the Judiciary.
The National Council of Justice has 15 members 
with a two-year term, and only one reappointment 
is admitted. In it the most prominent is the President 
of the Supreme Court, who is also the President 
of the Council. The Judge of the Superior Court 
of Justice, who is chosen to serve in the Council, 
was given a Corregidor position, who is the person 
responsible for answering to complaints about 
deviations and taking appropriate action. The Council 
also occupies a strategic position in the context of 
the Brazilian judiciary, since the Supreme Court, the 
highest court of the Judiciary Power, can only review 
its decisions.
One could say that, ten years after its creation, 
the National Council of Justice has emerged as 
a successful solution for Brazilian adjudicative 
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practice and that it has also changed the profile 
of Brazilian courts. It represented “(...) a sort of 
flagship of the so-called Judicial Reform”.  It is also 
viewed as a sentinel in the search for the efficiency 
of that power. It was noticed for editing several 
normative acts which deal with the  functioning  of 
the  judiciary,  giving  Brazilian  Justice  a  more 
systematic strategic vision.
Given our focus, it is worth to briefly mention some 
international experiences of control of the Judiciary, 
which is an important step to contextualize the 
Brazilian debate on the subject.
2. BRIEF ANALYSIS OF INTERNATIONAL 
EXPERIENCES OF JUDICIARY CONTROL
The creation of a Judiciary supervisory body in Brazil 
did not represent an unprecedented initiative, and 
one can consider previous international experiences 
of extreme relevance. The following research had 
two main emphases: (I) a summary of the main 
function of Councils, (II) its members.
For historical reasons, it’s worth mentioning that 
France’s was a pioneer in the Law of Judicial 
Organization on August 30, 1883. So their 
experience in the design of its Supreme Judicial 
Council is well respected. Currently, the Council 
is responsible appointing Judges and for t h e i r 
disciplinary control. It can be more broadly applied 
since the 2008 Constitutional  Reform,  and  it 
is   always   serving  the  purpose  of  ensuring 
the independence of the judiciary. Details about its 
members are specified in Article 65 of the 1958 
French Constitution, having “(...) the competent 
formation à l’une des Egard magistrats du siège et 
une competent formation à l’Egard des magistrats 
du parquet”. As Francis Hamon and Michel Troper 
mentioned, it is no longer lead by the President 
since 2008, this was done in order to increase 
its independence. This is an important supervisory 
experience, which can serve as an inspiration to 
other international experiences.
In Portugal, on the other hand, there is the Supreme 
Judicial Council, a body aimed at ensuring the 
independence of the judiciary according to the 
wording of Article 203 of the 1976 Constitution. 
And which has functions which are similar to 
those performed by the Brazilian National Judicial 
Council.  It is t h e  responsibility of this Council to 
appoint and promote Judges of the Courts as well as 
to take disciplinary actions. The Portuguese Council 
had only judges as its members at first, on a second 
stage it became mixed, with most members being 
of the judiciary, but having also external elements. 
Finally, from the review of 1997, the Supreme 
Judicial Council admits that most of its members 
are not Judges.
In Spain one can find the General Council of the 
Judiciary Power, a constitutional body, collegiate 
and autonomous composed of mixed elements, 
including both judges and external members. 
Its aim is to ensure independence in its judicial 
functions, being responsible for the appointment 
of Magistrates and their climbing in the career 
ladder, inspecting judicial activities and performing 
disciplinary functions. The Council has administrative 
functions and it was established under Article 122 of 
the 1978 Constitution based on the Italian model. It 
has 20 members that are chosen by Congress and 
Senate from Judges and Magistrates, as well as 
from jurists of recognized competence. Moreover, 
there is also the President, who is chosen by the 
Plenary Council.
In Italy, there is a Supreme Judicial Council, which 
is an autonomous body of the ordinary Magistrates, 
and which is also responsible for appointing Judges 
and handling their careers, as well as for the scope 
of disciplinary actions, according to article 105 of 
the Italian Constitution. Its membership is based on 
Article 104 of the Constitution, which provides the 
presence of three members by right: the President, 
the President of the Court of Cassation and the 
Attorney - General of the Court of Cassation. In 
addition, there is a prevision mentioning that two-
thirds of the members of the Council shall be elected 
from among the members of the Judiciary, with 
remnant one third chosen from among University 
professors and lawyers. Since 2002 there has  been 
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a  fixed  number  of  24  elected  members,  divided 
according  to  the guidelines above mentioned, of 
which 16 members are judges and 8 are not. It is 
worth mentioning Tania Groppi’s warning concerning 
the Italian system of judicial review, which is not 
able of coping with the demands of a pluralistic 
society, and which needs greater cooperation among 
judges and legislators in order to solve constitutional 
issues.  This conclusion represents an even greater 
challenge for the actions of the Council 2.
Beside the previously mentioned European 
experiences, the creation of Judiciary Councils 
has also echoed in Latin America, and the Brazilian 
experience is an example, which is the main focus 
of this study. Our region unfortunately has often only 
uncritically copied institutions that were designed 
in different institutional realities, and it is still a 
challenge to construct our own solutions for our 
specific problems, as noted by Jorge Esquirol.
A  brief  analysis  of  the  experiences  previously 
mentioned  with  regard  to discipline of the judicial 
function reveals a constant concern with career 
development of the Judges and the ethical rule of 
their actions. In Brazil, however, the creation of the 
National  Council  faced  a  strong  objection,  based 
on  the  argument  that  it  would disrespect the 
separation of power principle. This is what we shall 
discuss in the next part of this article.
3. ADI 3367 AND THE  SEPARATION OF POWER 
PRINCIPLE
Disagreeing with the creation of the National Council 
of Justice, the Association of Brazilian Magistrates 
- AMB proposed in the Supreme Court, a direct 
action of unconstitutionality.  In  Brazil,  the  judicial 
review  actions  may  be  filed  by  various entities, 
as defined in Article 103 of the Federal Constitution. 
In this particular case, the AMB mentioned Articles 
1 and 2 of Constitutional Amendment No. 45/04, 
arguing that the creation of the National Council of 
Justice violated two constitutional principles: (I) the 
separation of power principle, (II) the federal pact 2. 
This is the most direct and thorough  questioning 
faced  by the  Council  in  the  judicial  sphere,  which 
has  been mentioned in several papers written in 
Brazil on the subject.
3.1. The winning position: the constitutionality 
of the National Judicial Council
It is worth examining the arguments used by the 
current winning point of view in the Supreme Court, 
which defends the constitutionality of the creation of 
the National Council of Justice.
In this sense, the Rapporteur of the case, Juge Cezar 
Peluso, after making a historical analysis of the 
development of the separation of power principle, 
held to be possible the creation of the National 
Council of Justice according to  the Brazilian 
Constitution, stating that “(...) it is an organ of the 
judiciary (art. 92, IA), composed mostly of members 
of the same Power (article 103-B), appointed 
without direct interference of other Powers. 2 “ Juge 
Peluso tried to emphasize that the two attributions 
conferred by Constitutional Amendment to the 
National Council of Justice did not preclude the 
exercise of judicial functions and its performance, 
in fact, they contribute to enhance the functioning of 
the judiciary.
Since the specific focus of this research is on 
separation of powers, I will now examine the votes of 
the other Justices who participated in this argument. 
In this sense, the Juge Eros Grau is noteworthy. 
After mentioning that the principle of separation 
of powers “(...) is one of the most effective myths 
of the liberal state, crowned by the statement in 
article 16 of the Bill of the Rights of Man and of 
the Citizen of 1789 (...) 2, he said that Montesquieu 
never advocated an absolute separation of powers, 
and neither did he defended its impenetrability 
3. Montesquieu would have just argued for a 
distinction among the powers and their balance 
2. Faced with the absence of a universal model of 
separation of powers, each political society should 
adopt its particular separation profile. Juge Eros 
Grau mentioned the absence of external control 
of Judiciary Power through the National Council 
of Justice, stating that the presence of members 
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who are not part of the judiciary is not sufficient to 
justify the interference of a power over the other 
since members of the Council do not represent the 
agencies responsible their appointment.  Finally, 
this Justice cast the same vote as the Rapporteur 
Justice.
Then, t he  Juge Joaquim Barbosa voted. He 
pointed out that the argument that the creation 
of the National Council of Justice would violate the 
principle of separation of powers is not impressive, 
since the concept itself has been adapted throughout 
history. He mentioned that the principle does not 
mean a watertight division among the powers 
and that separation of powers should be seen as 
“(...) dispersion / diffusion of power (...)”. Finally, 
he expressed that most members of the National 
Council of Justice come from the Judiciary, and 
thus together with Justice Eros Grau, he agreed with 
the position of the Rapporteur Justice. 
The opinion of the Rapporteur Justice was also 
agreeded by the Juge Carlos Britto, who reinforced 
the above arguments, highlighting the fact that 
the National Council of Justice is an agency of the 
judiciary itself, which settles the claim of external 
control. Likewise, the Juge Gilmar Mendes, spoke 
saying that he believed that there was no disregard 
for the principle of separation of powers in the 
creation of the National Council. The  Juge Celso 
de Mello, in turn, cited the compatibility between 
the idea of social and external audits for the 
Republic, and then he totally agreed with point of 
view of Juge Cezar Peluso. In the same way t h e 
Juge Nelson Jobim, mentioned having  proposed 
a  design  of  the  Council  as  early  as  1987. 
Furthermore, he emphasized the whole debate 
concerning the members of the Council and, at the 
end, he voted in favor of the Rapporteru Justice.
Thus, most Justices of the Supreme Court –namely 
Juges Cezar Peluso, Eros Grau, Joaquim Barbosa, 
Carlos Brito, Gilmar Mendes, Celso de Mello 
and Nelson Jobim- held, in the case examined, 
that the National Council of Justice is an body with 
administrative, control, financial and functional 
purposes, and its creation does not violate the 
principle of separation of powers.
This conclusion was reached, according to the 
transcript votes, from the consideration that the 
Council: (I) does not exert external control of the 
judiciary, since it is part of the judiciary itself, (II) it 
does not infringe the judicial function, but merely 
having control and supervision tasks, (III) it does 
not have questionable members, since most of the 
members of National Council of Justice come from 
the Judiciary itself.
3.2. The position of the minority: violation of the 
principle of separation of powers
Nonetheless it is important to examine the arguments 
of the opposing view in the court. In particular, we 
highlight the view of the  Juge  E l l en  Gracie, who 
argued that the creation of the National Council 
violates the principle of separation of powers. This 
Justice considered improper the participation of 
external members to the Judiciary as members of 
the National Council of Justice, which is a disregard 
to what she called “(...) a qualified independence 
of the Judiciary Power (...)”. At the end, she was in 
favor of a partial declaration of unconstitutionality 
because the presence of members who have no 
relation to the judiciary would violate the separation 
of powers. 
The Juge Carlos Velloso joined the vote of the Juge 
Ellen Gracie. When casting his vote, he cited the 
Judicial Council in France, noting that “(...) in France, 
when the issues are related to the magistrates, the 
members who are not a magistrate, do not vote 
(...)”. He supported the need for the creation of a 
Council to control the administrative and financial 
operations of the judiciary and the proper discharge 
of official duties of judges and officials in Brazil, but 
he also disagreed with the presence of members 
who are not of the magistrate, but who are part of 
the Council of the Judiciary.
The Juge Sepúlveda Pertence was also contrary to 
members of the Judicial Council with no relation 
to the Judiciary. Although he did not disagreed 
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with the creation  of  the  National  Council,  he 
criticized  the  interference  of  the Legislature  as 
far  as  its  members  are  concerned ,  highlighting 
that  the  Supreme Councils of Italy and Portugal 
have imposed restrictions on the participation 
certain people in the Council. But Brazil did not do 
that, here citizens can serve terms and they can 
be reappointed to positions in the Council. Finally, 
unlike the other Justices who were part of the 
unsuccessful minority, Juge Sepúlveda Pertence 
only disagreed with the presence of citizens in the 
Council, but he did not consider the presence of 
lawyers and prosecutors a problem.
In turn, Justice Marco Aurélio held totally unfounded 
the action of unconstitutionality presented, having 
an isolated position in the context of the trial.
4. THE  NATIONAL  COUNCIL  OF  JUSTICE  AND 
JUDICIAL  REVIEW:  IN  DEFENSE  OF  A  NEW 
FUNCTION
Thus, in view of the dismissal of the argument that 
the National Council of Justice would represent 
a breach of the principle of separation of powers, 
and since a decade has passed since its creation 
in Brazil, it is worth reflecting on the next steps 
regarding the development of the Council.  In this 
sense, I propose a new role for the National Council, 
a novelty that has the potential of contributing to the 
improvement of judicial review in Brazil or in other 
countries that have the same problem.
Like other constitutional experiences of American 
influence, the Brazilian judicial review ensures that 
any Judge or Court may, in an action submitted to 
it, disregard any law or normative act on grounds 
of unconstitutionality. In this situation, the Brazilian 
practice of judicial review has absorbed the 
American system, which is based on the famous 
case Marbury vs. Madison in the year 1803. This 
case is a notorious decision reference of judicial 
review, and even before the existence of relevant 
precedents, it continues to bear special significance. 
Wolfgang Hoffmann- Riem, writing about the case, 
believed it was a “velvet revolution” in the context 
of global control.
It is worth elucidating however, that the Brazilian 
model of control was also influenced by Hans Kelsen 
solution in Austria in 1920 by taking actions of 
constitutionality direct control to the Constitutional 
Court. Which would avoid the lack of decision 
uniformity, a typical problem of the American 
system. The design of the Constitutional Court 
would derive, according to Mario Lozano, from the 
Kelsian pyramidal construction of legal positivism 
itself.  It is worth mentioning, however, that the 
proliferation of the solution built by Kelsen only 
occurred after the end of World War II, allowing 
such features to build a European model of control, 
which was stressed by Pasquale Pasquino. There 
are also several reasons why the American model 
was adopted by European countries after the War, 
as pointed out by John Ferehohn, but this is beyond 
the scope of this research.
Therefore, Brazil has a reality in which there are two 
different control traditions, and it receives other 
external influences, which makes its complexity 
evident. It does not have, however, a Constitutional 
Court similar to the Austrian one, because it opted 
for the control of a Supreme Court of the Judiciary 
Power, following, in particular, the tendency of 
Latin American countries, as illustrated by Donald 
Horowitz.
Given the focus of this research, I will now examine 
a specific trait of the American influence control 
in Brazil, which is also known as concrete control: 
the absence of statistical and detailed knowledge 
concerning cases in which unconstitutionality was 
declared by the Judges and by the Courts.
The national practical experience shows that 
there is no systematic knowledge of several cases 
in which judges and courts decide to oust the 
application. Namely, of the law   that   offends 
the   Constitution.   In   Brazil   the   possibility   of 
declaring unconstitutionality is guaranteed, but on 
the other hand, there is no systematization of laws 
are usually declared unconstitutional by the Justice 
in concrete cases, nor is it possible  to  know  which 
the  arguments  are  commonly  used  to  support 
unconstitutionality.
121
G
a
b
ri
e
l 
D
ia
s 
M
a
rq
u
e
s 
d
a
 C
ru
z
No. 12 - Enero a Diciembre de 2013Revista Jurídica Piélagus
This gap proves to be problematic, as this lack of 
knowledge enables the proliferation of judicial 
decisions that exclude the application of laws 
passed by the Brazilian legislature, and which 
continue to be the general rule in the country. 
This point needs to be better elucidated: in the 
general control of Brazilian constitutionality the law 
is enforced only in case some judges or courts 
have such understanding. In short, the law is still 
valid in the abstract framework, and its application 
is rejected only in individual case.
From surveys conducted in this Doctoral thesis, I 
argue that the National Council of Justice should 
edit resolution mapping parameters concerning the 
need for communication to the Council, by electronic 
means, about any case where there is a decision 
of unconstitutionality.  Therefore, I advocate the 
creation of a “National Registry of Unconstitutionality 
Decisions”. This would enable the National Council 
of Justice to truly know the situations in which a 
law was not enforced due to fact that it disrespect 
the Constitution. The previously mentioned registry 
could be created in a simple way, based on the 
existence of similar registries, which were also 
designed by the Council for other issues in which 
the need of systematization had been noticed long 
before.
The paradoxical conclusion is that Brazil still has not 
systematized knowledge on a subject that should 
receive greater attention: the cases in which a 
law is declared unconstitutional by the judiciary.
It is worth noting that the National Judicial Council 
has regulatory power and it may, according to the 
Brazilian Federal Constitution, edit acts necessary 
to carry out its function  having  as  parameter 
the  existence  of  a  previous  legal  provision. 
The resolution of creating the National Registry of 
Unconstitutionality Decisions is in accordance with 
the assumptions previously mentioned, and it would 
result in greater knowledge of the purpose of such 
a relevant issue.
It  would  be  the responsibility  of  the  National 
Council  the  new  function  of registering cases of 
judicial review in Brazil, allowing open public debate 
on the issues which are the most discussed and 
arguments handled in court.
It is worth mentioning the importance of having a 
judiciary which functions appropriately and which 
ensures rights in places where the process of 
institutional strengthening is still slow. In this sense, 
a discussion about the democratic legitimacy of the 
judiciary is important, even though it is also peculiar 
in constitutional experiences such as the one in 
Brazil, where judicial decisions are frequently the 
way to guarantee rights that are not guaranteed by 
other Powers. In this sense, the debate of procedural 
and substantial theories has its own purposes, which 
cannot be approached with the desired depth due to 
the limitations of the research.
Therefore, by preserving the general traits that 
characterize the complexity of control practices in 
Brazil, the creation of the National Registry would 
be able of drawing a statistical framework of 
laws and normative acts. Which were declared 
unconstitutional by Judges and Courts in a 
concrete control of constitutionality, promoting  its 
dissemination  and  actual  knowledge  on  part  of 
other  actors  in  the Judiciary Power and on part of 
society.
By being aware of the reality of a concrete control we 
could ensure not only the doctrinal and jurisprudential 
understanding of the existing cases, but we could 
also acquire an important understanding of the 
practical functioning of public policies designed by 
the Legislative Power, which are the most common 
obstacles to its implementation. This perspective 
has greater importance in a region such as Latin 
America, where there is institutional instability 
and where the system is not mature enough to 
set aside the fear of having to face repeatedly a 
restrictive regime where fundamental rights are not 
guaranteed.
Thus, since the argument that the creation of 
the National Council of Justice would violate the 
separation of powers was not considered valid, 
now is the right time to create the body, which 
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would be an interface between the Judiciary and 
the Legislative Power, through the creation of the 
National Registry of Unconstitutionality Decisions. 
The National Council of Justice, which was at first 
charged of being responsible for the violator of the 
principle of separation of powers, can now function 
as a harmonization tool.
CONCLUSION
This study comes to two conclusions. First, one must 
recognize the importance of fact that the Supreme 
Court declared the constitutionality of the National 
Judicial Council. Allowing it to operate  under the 
supervision of the Judiciary due to the fact that 
the argument that its creation would violate the 
principle of separation of powers was dismissed. 
This means that there is recognition of the legitimacy 
of the Brazilian Council, which is authorized to 
perform important tasks to control the career of 
Magistracy and to carry out disciplinary actions; 
the same measures were adopted by European and 
Latin American Councils.
Moreover, since the issue of legitimacy of the Council 
was already settled, I recommend an advance in the 
action of National Council of Justice: the creation of 
a National Registry of Unconstitutional Decisions. 
Which would be a tool, linked to the systematization 
of judicial review decisions. This would be based on 
the premise that systematic knowledge of cases 
in which any specific law or normative act was 
considered unconstitutional, would allow greater 
reflection on the development and implementation 
of public policies. An issue that has even greater 
importance in the case of a Nation, which has as its 
constitutional objective to attain the status of a free, 
just and socially conscious society.
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